Abstract-In this paper we provide a quantum public-key cryptosystem using non-orthogonal states. A user Alice uses a set of particles which are in non-orthogonal quantum states as the public key kept by a key management center (KMC) while she keeps the states of the particles secret as the private key. By the help of KMC any other user can send encrypted message to Alice. Any one including KMC except Alice can't get the message. On the other hand digital signature can also be achieved by this public-key cryptosystem. There are no entangled states and complex operations needed in our cryptosystem. So it's easier to carry out in practice and more robust against possible attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
The aim of cryptography is to send secret information through an insecure channel. To keep the information secret, people often integrate the original information (called "plain text") with some auxiliary information (called "key") to produce the encrypted information (called "cipher text"). Only the cipher text is transmitted so anyone can get the cipher text. But no one can recover the plain text except the authenticated user who has the key. Then two users who share the key can achieve secret communications. But how to distribute the key is the most important and most difficult problem. In fact there are nearly no unconditionally secure key distribution protocols in classical cryptography.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol is a good way to solve this problem. In QKD protocols we can achieve unconditional secure key distribution with an insecure quantum channel and an insecure but authenticated classical channel. The first quantum key distribution protocol is proposed by C. H. Bennett and G. Brassard in 1984 ( so called BB84 protocol) [1] . Since then many quantum key distribution protocols have been established and their securities have been studied, such as the EPR schemes [2] , B92 [3] , the scheme of Lo-Chau [4] , and so on [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] . On the other hand experimental work for OKD has also succeeded. In 1992 Bennett, Bessette and Brassard first realized BB84 scheme in laboratory [14] . Recently QKD in optical fiber has been achieved beyond 150 km [15] and in free space has been implemented over a distance of 1 km [16] .
All the QKD protocols above belong to symmetrical key protocols. There is a serious difficulty in symmetrical key protocols: how to distribute and manage keys if many users want to communicate with each other? If there are N users in a cryptosystem, a user must share a key with any other user. So every user must keep N-1 keys secret to exchange information with the other N-1 users. On the other hand, N(N-1)/2 key distribution processes should be fulfilled before the cryptosystem begins to work. Obviously it's too tedious and too complex when N is a large number! Moreover in practice maybe the users don't trust each other, which make key distribution impossible. In classical cryptography a solution to overcome such difficulties is public-key cryptosystem, for example RSA algorithm [17] . Every user has a public key and a private key. The cipher text encrypted by the public key can only be decrypted by the private key while cipher text encrypted by the private key can only be decrypted by the public key. Moreover the public key and the private key are independent that we can't deduce one key from the other. A key management center (KMC) keeps all users' public keys which every user can get while every user keeps his or her private key secret which no other people can get. When a user Alice wants to send a secret message to another user Bob, she first asks KMC for the latter's public key .and encrypt the message by the public key. Then Alice sends the encrypted message (the cipher text) to Bob. When Bob receives the cipher text, he decrypted the cipher text by his private key. Finally Bob get the plain text. Any eavesdropper who catches the cipher text can't recover the plain text because he or she hasn't Bob's private key. Public-key cryptosystem has been widely used in all aspects of modern society, such as commercial affairs, military affairs, network communications, and et al. But as known in 1994 RSA algorithm has been proved to be unsafe on future quantum computer by Peter Shor [18] . So the classical public-key cryptosystems based on RSA algorithm will become unreliable inevitably. Quantum public-key technology may be a good alterative solution. Gottesman first provided a quantum one-way function to design quantum digital signature protocol in [19] , which may be used in a public-key system. In [20] a similar scheme is provided. In 2008 Nikolopoulos presented the first unconditional quantum public-key scheme [21] which uses single-particle rotation of unknown quantum states. Since then several public-key schemes have been developed [22] [23] [24] [25] .
In this paper we provide a quantum public-key cryptosystem using non-orthogonal states. It is based on the indistinguishability of non-orthogonal quantum states. With the help of the key management center, N users can communicate with each other securely. Moreover digital signature of the message can be fulfilled naturally by the public-key cryptosystem. Our cryptosystem doesn't need entangled states and complex operations. So it's easier to carry out in practice and more robust against possible attacks.
II. BASIC IDEA
In quantum information science a quantum two-state particle is often called a qubit. A qubit's state space is a two-dimension Hilbert space. Such states are possible states of a qubit.
We can notice that they aren't orthogonal to each other. As known the four states form two complete orthogonal basic vector sets
in which we can measure the qubit. It's known that nonorthogonal quantum states can't be discriminated with certainty, that is to say, there are no ways to determine one state of the four states in (1) with certainty. Now let's consider a public-key cryptosystem which includes a key management center (KMC) and N users. KMC keeps every user's public key which anyone can get to encrypt plain text while every user keeps his private key secret to decrypt cipher text. A user, for example Alice, creates an n-qubits sequence in which a qubit is in one of the state |0>, |1>, |+>, |-> at random. They constitute one public key of Alice's. At the same time Alice records the n qubits' states as a state sequence Moreover the state of any qubit hasn't changed. Now if Bob wants to send Alice an n-bit string, he can encode the information using the n qubits. To any bit of the string, if it's "0", Bob performs according to coding rule 1.
Coding Rule 1:
If the state of qubit is |0>, Bob do nothing; If the state of qubit is |1>, Bob reverses it to |0>; If the state of qubit is |+>, Bob do nothing; If the state of qubit is |->, Bob reverses it to |+>.
On the other hand, if the bit is "1", Bob performs according to coding rule 2.
Coding Rule 2:
If the state of qubit is |0>, Bob reverses it to |1>; If the state of qubit is |1>, Bob do nothing; If the state of qubit is |+>, Bob reverses it to |->; If the state of qubit is |->, Bob do nothing.
The process of the coding rules can be described as the following tables. ϕ . Then Alice compares every bit of ' ϕ with the corresponding bit of ϕ and records according to decoding rule.
Decoding Rule:
If the two bits from ' ϕ and from ϕ are same, she records it as "0"; if the two bits from ' ϕ and form ϕ are converse, she records it as "1".
The coding rules can be described as the following table. 
Finally Alice gets an n-bit string denoted as P'. Obviously we have P'=P, or in other words, Alice gets the plain text Bob wants to send her. In section 4 we will prove that by a well-designed scheme no we can affirm that no one except Alice and Bob can get the plain text. So the communication between Bob and Alice is secure.
There is still a problem left. The public key, or in other words, the n-qubit sequence is consumed after a communication process. So it can be used for only one time. If all the N-1 users want to send secret message to Alice, KMC must preserve at least N-1 public keys for Alice. Moreover Bob has gotten ϕ after a communication process with Alice! So the N-1 public keys must not be N-1 copies of a n-qubit sequence but N-1 different n-qubit sequences otherwise Bob will be able to get any message other user sends to Alice in future. In practice a user maybe needs to communicate with Alice for many times. So we can assume that KMC should keep M(M>>N) public key for Alice. So does every user in our cryptosystem. In order to discriminate the M public keys of Alice, every public key should be given a unique id number.
So we can design a feasible public-key cryptosystem based on this idea.
III. QUANTUM PUBLIC-KEY CRYPTOSYSTEM USING NON-ORTHOGONAL STATES
Now we present our public-key cryptosystem.
A. Building the Public-key Cryptosystem
First we assume that there are N users and a KMC in our public-key cryptosystem. They can communicate with each other through a classical channel and a quantum channel. KMC is trusted by every user while any two users don't trust each other. Every user creates M (M>>N) public keys. Every public key is an n-qubit sequence in which a qubit is in one of the states |0>, |1>, |+> or |-> at random. For example, KMC keeps Alice's M public keys denoted as
Q is an n-qubit sequence and i is the id number.
Every qubit of i Q is in one of the states |0>, |1>, |+> or |-> at random. On the other hand, Alice keeps her private keys denoted as
So does every user in the cryptosystem. All users' public keys are open to any user, in other words, any user can asks KMC for any public key of any other user. But a public key can only be given to one user because it will be consumed and no longer exist. At the same time every user must keep his or her private keys absolutely secret. A private key can also be used for one time so that it will be abandoned after finishing a communication process.
B. Process of the Secret Communication
If Bob wants to send a secret message denoted as a binary string P to Alice, they perform the following steps.
Step 1: Bob asks KMC for one of Alice's public keys.
Step 2: KMC chooses a public key ) , ( j Q j from Alice's PU K at random and gives it to Bob.
Step 3: After receiving the public key, Bob gets the id number j and sends it to Alice through the classical channel.
Step 4: After receiving the id number j, Alice queries it in her PR K and gets the corresponding j ϕ . Then she replies to Bob through the classical channel, telling Bob to measure all the qubit of j Q according to Key Rule, or in other words, she sends the measurement basis sequence j B to Bob.
Step 5: When Bob receives Alice's dictates, Bob performs measurements as Alice asks. At last Bob gets j ϕ .
Step 6: Bob encodes P on j Q according to Coding If Alice wants to send a secret message to Bob, they need only exchange the roles in the process above. So any two users can achieve secret communications using our public-key cryptosystem.
C. Digital Signature
First all users agree to the following rule. Signature Rule: If the state is |0> or |+>, we records as "0"; If the state is |1> or |->, we records as "1".
If Bob sends secret a message P' to Alice, he can sign the message to prove his identity to Alice. What Bob needs to do is to attach a classical message (the signed message) with the original message that he wants send to Alice. To produce the signed message, Bob performs the following steps.
Step 1: Bob produces an m-bit abstract PA from P' which he wants to send Alice by a hash algorithm, for example SHA-1 algorithm.
Step 2: Bob chooses one of his private keys at random, for example k ϕ . Then he produces an m-bit string PK from the first m items of k ϕ according to Signature Rule.
Step 3: Bob performs XOR operation between PA and PK. Finally he gets an m-bit string PS which is just the signed message.
Step 4: Bob attaches PS and the id number k with P'. So he gets a string P which is the plain text to be submitted to Alice.
Notice that now the length of P should be n. So the length of the original message P' added with the length of the number k should be n-m. If P can't satisfy it, we can always make it by dividing it into several parts or adding supplementary bits.
Then Bob and Alice can finish the communication by doing the steps in section III.
After Alice gets the plain text, she can extract the original message P, the signed message PS and the id number k. To verify the signature, she does the following steps.
Step 1: Alice asks KMC for Bob's no. k public key k Q .
Step 2: Alice asks Bob for the sequence of measurement basis k B through the public classical channel.
Step 3 Step 4: Alice performs XOR operation between PK' and PS. So she gets an m-bit string PA'.
Step 5: Alice produces the abstract PA of P' by SHA-1 algorithm just as Bob does.
Step 6: Alice compare PA' and PA. If they are same, the verification succeeds. Alice can be sure that the message is just from Bob.
IV. SECURITY OF THE PUBLIC-KEY CRYPTOSYSTEM
Our public-key cryptosystem is secure. Two users can communicate with each other secretly. Any other people including KMC can not get the message. We prove it as follows.
Let's assume that an eavesdropper, for example, Eve, wants to get the message transmitted from Bob to Alice.
A. Impossibility for Eavesdropper to Get theMessage
Eve may listen to both the classical channel and the quantum channel, trying to get the message from Bob to Alice. She can not only get Alice's dictates to Bob in step 4 but also get the n-qubit sequence But she can't get the message P that Bob wants to send Alice at all because she has no j ϕ which is kept secret by Alice. The message P is encoded in the difference between ' j ϕ and j ϕ . Eve can get no information about P only from ' j ϕ . As known j ϕ is a random state sequence. So the probability that Eve succeeds in getting P is no more than the probability she just guess the every bit of P which is
If n=1000, we have 300 1000 10 2
It's a number too small to imagine. So Eve's attack is sure to fail.
B. Impossibility for KMC to Get the Message
It's easy to prove that KMC can't get message that Bob sends to Alice even though it keeps the public keys and joins in the communications process. Alice's public key is a qubit sequence in which a qubit may be in one of the four states
at random. But Alice doesn't tell KMC in which state any qubit of the sequence is. Moreover the four states aren't orthogonal to each other. So it's impossible for KMC to find in which state the qubit is with certainty. The probability that KMC fortunately get to know a qubit's state correctly is 
If n=1000, we have 
C. Impossibility for Eavesdropper to Distort the Message
We prove that the Eve can't distort the secret message from Bob to Alice. Eve may catch the qubit sequence 
That is to say, such attack also fails. it's impossible for KMC to make Alice to get a message which is just the one that it wants Alice to get. What KMC can achieve is only to make Alice getting a disordered and meaningless binary string. Of course Alice will find that something is wrong at once. So KMC's cheating can't succeed.
D. Impossibility for KMC to distort the Message

E. Security against Forward Search Attack
In classical public-key cryptosystem, how to defeat forward search attack is an important problem which can't be ignored. The forward search attack can be described as follows. Since Alice's public key is kept by KMC, every user who wants to sends a message to Alice must ask KMC for Alice's public key. All cipher texts are encrypted by Alice's public key. So Eve may encrypt many plain texts by Alice's public key to produce many cipher texts and save them in her database. Then Eve catches all cipher texts sent to Alice and queries them in her database. If she just finds that a cipher text which a user sends to Alice is the same as one cipher text in her database, she can conclude that the plain text which the user wants to send Alice is just the plain text she used to produce the cipher text in her database. Finally Eve gets the secret message transmitted to Alice. But in our quantum public-key cryptosystem, forward search attack is meaningless because Alice has many public keys in which a public key can be used only one time. Encrypting the same plain texts by different public keys of course produces different cipher texts.
So forward search attack is sure to be unsuccessful. This is a big advantage of our public-key system.
F. Security of Digital Signature
Now we prove that our cryptosystem can solve digital signature problem, too. How does Alice assure that the message is really from Bob? If Eve wants to impersonate Bob, she must produce signed message to cheat Alice. It's easy for Eve to produce the abstract PA from the message she wants to send Alice by SHA-1 algorithm. But Eve doesn't know Bob's private key at all which it's necessary to produce the signed message PS. Since Bob keeps his private key secret, what Eve can do is only to guess PK. So the probability for Eve to guess correctly for all the m bit of PK is
If m=100, we have 
It's such a small probability. So Eve has no chances to cheat Alice successfully. Or in other words, Alice can assure that the message is from Bob. So we can say that our public-key cryptosystem provides a reliable signature method.
G. Security against Resend Attcak
In classical public-key cryptosystem, Eve may take the strategy of resend attack. She can catch the message sent form Bob to Alice and make a copy of it. Then she resends the message after some time, for example two days or two months. Obviously Alice has no means to percept such attack because the message is indeed from Bob. So Eve can make Alice to receive an outdated and repeated message although Eve doesn't know the message at all. To solve this problem, people should add timestamp to the original plain text so as Alice can find that the message is outdated. Obviously users have to pay more cost to producing and verifying timestamp.
In our quantum public-key cryptosystem, resend attack is not a problem at all. So resend attack can't succeed in our public-key cryptosystem.
H. Security against Chosen Plain Text Attack
Our public-key cryptosystem is secure under chosen plain text attack. We prove it as follows.
In a chosen plain text attack, Eve is allowed to obtain a random number (plain text, cipher text) pairs of her choice. Then she tries to find some information about the key. In classical cryptography chosen plain text attack is a power tool to crash the cryptographic system if the number is large enough. But in our public-key cryptosystem the public key can be used for only one time. Different cipher texts are produced by different public keys. So there are no correlations between them. Eve can't find any laws which can help her to find some information about the key. Although Eve may get as many as possible (plain text, cipher text) pairs, she is still unable to get any information helpful to break our publickey cryptosystem. So chosen plain text attack is invalid to our public-key cryptosystem. Now we have proved that our public-key cryptosystem is unconditionally secure.
V. FEASIBILITY ANALYSIS OF THE PUBLIC-KEY
CRYPTOSYSTEM
First our public-key cryptosystem isn't an imaginary plan based on the technology which doesn't existT T or the technology difficult to carry out. All that the users need to do are performing measurement on a qubit, reversing a qubit whose states is known and transmitting qubits through a quantum channel. There are no entangled states and complex quantum operations needed at all. So it is easier to carry out in practice.
Second as known quantum cryptography depends on the special properties of quantum system. But in practice quantum systems often undergo decoherence over time which makes them to lose quantum coherence and to turn into classical systems inevitably. It's the most important problem for quantum cryptographic protocol to work in practice. Especially in public-key cryptosystem, KMC needs to keep all users' public keys which are quantum systems for some time until a user asks for them. This brings a serious challenge for quantum public-key cryptosystem. To overcome this difficulty, we can use the quantum system which has bigger time length of decoherence, such as photon in Single-mode fiber. On the other hand users can update their public keys periodically. By means of such methods, our cryptosystem can perform well to satisfy all users.
Third all these discussions above are based on that Alice and Bob always using noiseless channels to build a key in our protocol. If there are no noiseless channels, can this protocol work? We can study it, too. Let's consider noisy classical channel first. In step 3, step 4 and step5, Bob and Alice exchange classical information which is necessary to the next step. If there errors in transmission, Bob is sure to fail. Fortunately classical error-correcting coding technology has been a mature and powerful tool. We can fulfill information transmission through a noisy classical channel with very low error rate by error-correcting coding, which guarantees the classical information to be correctly exchanged between Alice and Bob. On the other hand, in step 6 Bob sends the qubit sequence ' j Q to Alice through the quantum channel. If there are random errors existing, Alice will get mistaken bits, which also means communication failure. The solution is error-correcting coding, too. Although quantum error-correcting coding technology is not as mature as classical error-correcting coding technology, it can provide rather satisfying results for most quantum channel.
VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
We have pointed out that a public key can be used for only one time in our cryptosystem. This limits the number of user. If KMC keeps M public keys for Alice, M users can send message to Alice at most. If one user needs to communicate with Alice for many times, the number who can exchange information with Alice will be further depressed. Such limit can be removed by developing cryptosystem in which public key can be reused. We will discuss it in future work.
In this paper we provide a quantum public-key cryptosystem using non-orthogonal states. N users can achieve secret communications by the help of a key management center. The laws of quantum mechanics guarantee that our cryptosystem is unconditionally secure. No one except the two parts involved in communication can get the message. The message can be signed so that the sender's identity can be verified. No entangled states and complex operations are needed. So our cryptosystem is easy to carry out in practice. Moreover it is proved to be secure against possible attacks.
